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The quality of democracy: From crises and success stories

Bühlmann, M

Abstract: In this contribution I use the Democracy Barometer, a new instrument designed to measure the quality of established democracies. This instrument is based upon a broad concept of democracy, embracing three principles (freedom, equality, and control) that are ensured by nine functions (individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere, competition, mutual constraints, governmental capability, transparency, participation, and representation). Measuring the degrees of fulfillment for each of these functions allows for cross-country and longitudinal comparisons of the quality of democracy in more than 50 democratic governments between 1990 and 2007. Here, I aspire to four goals: first, I present the Democracy Barometer; second, I describe varieties of democracies in terms of quality; third, I provide a finer grained description of the various patterns of both success and crises; and fourth, I attempt to explain the various developments. The analyses reveal that (1) a huge variety of democracies exists, in terms of different forms and accentuations of the various elements of qualified democracies; (2) there exists neither a crisis of democracy, nor any sign of an end to history; (3) modernization theory, human development, and institutions can explain the variation in development in terms of the quality of democracy in different countries over time. All in all, the Democracy Barometer allows for a very fine-grained analysis of one of the most complex phenomenon in political science: democracy.

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THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY; CRISES AND SUCCESS STORIES

Paper proposal for the panel

'Challenges and transformations in the Qualities of Democracies: a comparative perspective'

at the IPSA-ECPR joint conference, Sao Paulo, February 16-19, 2011

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Abstract

In this contribution I use the Democracy Barometer, a new instrument designed to measure the quality of established democracies. This instrument is based upon a broad concept of democracy, embracing three principles (freedom, equality, and control) that are ensured by nine functions (individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere, competition, mutual constraints, governmental capability, transparency, participation, and representation). Measuring the degrees of fulfillment for each of these functions allows for cross-country and longitudinal comparisons of the quality of democracy in more than 50 democratic governments between 1990 and 2007. Here, I aspire to four goals: first, I present the Democracy Barometer; second, I describe varieties of democracies in terms of quality; third, I provide a finer grained description of the various patterns of both success and crises; and fourth, I attempt to explain the various developments. The analyses reveal that (1) a huge variety of democracies exists, in terms of different forms and accentuations of the various elements of qualified democracies; (2) there exists neither a crisis of democracy, nor any sign of an end to history; (3) modernization theory, human development, and institutions can explain the variation in development in terms of the quality of democracy in different countries over time. All in all, the Democracy Barometer allows for a very fine-grained analysis of one of the most complex phenomenon in political science: democracy.

(1) INTRODUCTION¹

The diagnosis of the crises of democracy is as old as democracy itself. The idea of the downfall of the democratic state has long been a central theme in European political thought. Most often, however, the crises theses are based upon short-term observations, political scandals, subjective assessments, or even anecdotal experiences. Of course, more optimistic scenarios have also existed, such as the end of history thesis following the end of the cold war (Fukuyama, 1992). However, such encomia have typically been rather short-lived.

Needless to say, critical thinking is extremely important in the development of science and even of society. Thus, the presentiment of crises lies at the very heart of science. It is the clarification of atony that helps a system to ameliorate and recover. Periodically, at least, we should look back and compare actual situations with events of the past. Scientific diagnostics should not rest solely upon single incidents but should also carefully examine developments over the long term and foremost base on theoretically and empirically well-grounded comparisons.

To observe and compare the development of democracy, we can apply different tools. Democracy indices such as Polity (Jagers & Gurr, 1995), Freedom House (Gastil, 1990), or the Vanhanen's index of democracy, (Vanhanen, 1997, 2000, 2003) can indeed portray the celebrated waves of democracy (Huntington, 1991; for a critique of this idea, see Dorenspleet, 2000), that is to say, we can observe that the world overall becomes more and more democratic with time. However, a deeper look at established democracies using these instruments is not satisfactory. Most Western democracies (according to Polity or Freedom House) are perfect democracies. Switzerland or the United States, for instance, score highest on Polity, due their existences as nation states and the beginning of their polity measures, respectively (1848 for Switzerland and 1810 for the USA). However, when we consider that female suffrage was only introduced in Switzerland in 1971, and realizing that discrimination in terms of suffrage rights in the United States was only abolished in 1965, the idea that both countries should be considered to have been perfect democracies for centuries is puzzling. The same holds true for Freedom House: in the year 2001, Berlusconi-Italy is rated with the same maximum value as Persson-Sweden is. Intuitively guessing that the rule of law or quality of press suffers in Italy, whereas political equality has been high in Scandinavia during the early years of the 21st century, one would expect that there would be differences in an assessment of the *quality* of these two democracies.

¹ The author would like to thank NCCR Democracy at the University of Zurich, sponsored by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Center for Democracy Studies in Aarau, for their grants and financial support. The author is a member of the project-team for the "The Democracy Barometer" within NCCR Democracy. The team is composed of members from Switzerland (Lisa Müller, Stefani Gerber, Miriam Hänni, Ruth Kunz, Lisa Schädel, Max Schubiger, Isabel Vollenweider, and David Zumbach) as well as from the Social Science Center in Berlin (Germany: Wolfgang Merkel, Heiko Giebler, Bernhard Wessels, and Dag Tanneberg).

Thus, to measure the development of democracies, an instrument should be utilized that is able to do at least two things: first, it should measure the differences between established democracies; second it should indicate the development of the quality of a given democracy over time.

In this article, I present such an instrument: the Democracy Barometer (DB). The DB was developed to respond to the growing number of requests for measurements of the quality of democracy. The question no longer is whether a political system can be considered a democracy or not. Instead, rather, democracy research focuses increasingly on the assessment of the quality of established democracies (Altman & Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Moreover, the DB attempts to overcome the methodological and conceptual shortcomings of previous measures (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Bollen & Paxton, 2000; Hadenius & Teorell, 2005; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).

In the following section (2), I present the conceptual basis of the DB. Applying this new instrument to more than 50 established democracies in a timespan between 1990 and 2007, I first provide an overview of the various types of democracies (section 3), and then, in section 4, I examine in greater depth the development of the quality of the various nation states. Here, I strive to answer the question of whether the pessimist crisis thesis or the more optimistic scenario of a rise in quality prevails, and how various developments can be explained. In section 5, I discuss the findings.

(2) THE DEMOCRACY BAROMETER

In order to overcome the minimalism of previous democracy measurements, the DB is based on a middle range concept of democracy, embracing liberal² as well as participatory³ ideas of democracy (Bühlmann et al., 2011). Contrary to most existing democracy measurements, the concept of the DB consists of a stringent discussion and stepwise theoretical deduction of the fundamental elements of democracy. Beginning with the deduction of three core principles of (liberal and participatory) democracy, nine functions are deduced. The degree of fulfillment of each of these nine functions, which define the quality of democracy, are asserted with various components that are themselves measured by different theoretically deduced subcomponents and indicators.

² The liberal concept of democracy originates from classical republicanism in its protective version (the most prominent representatives of these ideas are Locke or Montesquieu), the classical liberal model of democracy (as defended by Mill, Tocqueville or the Federalist Papers), and its more modern developments in the form of the elitist (Weber, 1921) or the pluralist models of democracy (Dahl 1956; Fraenkel 1963). One of the most pronounced versions is Schumpeter's (1950) realist model.

³ The participatory type is rooted in the classical Athenian democracy (Fenske et al., 1994, p. 37), the developmental form of classical republicanism (with Rousseau being the most prominent representative), ideas of direct as well as participatory democracy (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970), and deliberative democracy (Cohen & Fung, 2004; Habermas, 1992; Warren, 1996).

THE PRINCIPLES: FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND CONTROL

We begin with the premise that a democratic system seeks to establish a positive balance between the normative, interdependent values of freedom and equality, and that such balance requires control. Control has an additional value for democracy, because it is the institutionalized checking of the political authorities that distinguishes democratic systems from autocratic ones.

Freedom refers to the absence of heteronomy (Berlin, 2006). Protection and guarantee of individual rights under a secure rule of law have become a minimal condition for democratic regimes (Beetham, 2004). Democracy and the rule of law are even seen as equiprimordial ("gleichursprünglich"; Habermas, 2001). Only under a secure rule of law, where the state is bound to the effective law and acts according to clearly defined prerogatives (Elster, 1988), can individuals be certain that they are protected from infringements of their personal freedom by the state. Constitutional individual liberties include the legal protection of life, freedom of opinion, and property rights - the threefold meaning of Locke's (1974) term, property.

Additional basic rights integral to democracy are the freedom of association and of opinion, which enable a lively and active public sphere (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Freedom of opinion, however, depends upon the circumstances of information (Sartori, 1987). A free flow of information must be installed and the possibility to take part in the public sphere must be ensured. Hence, individual liberties and rule of law, as well as an active and legally secured public sphere, guarantee the principle of freedom (Beetham, 2004). Historically as well as functionally, freedom is strongly associated with the idea of the sovereignty of citizens. Indeed, freedom seems only possible where all citizens equally dispose of guaranteed political rights (Habermas, 1992). This leads us to the second principle: equality.

Equality, particularly understood as political equality, implies that all citizens are treated as equals in the political process (Dahl, 1956, 1998) and that all citizens have equal access to political power (Saward, 1998). Thus, the rather abstract principle of equality manifests in a more concrete feature of democratic governance: full inclusion of all persons subject to the legislation of a democratic state (Dahl, 1998, p. 75). There are at least two reasons to regard equality a fundamental principle of democracy. First, in modern secular societies, there is no objective basis for valuation on whether the conduct in life of individual A is better than that of individual B. Second, no persons are so "definitely better qualified than others to govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the state" (Dahl, 1998, p. 75). Political equality thus aims at the equal formulation, equal consideration, and equal inclusion of all citizens' preferences. Inclusive participation, representation, and transparency are required to reach this goal.

An equal formulation of preferences depends upon participation. As Lijphart (1997, p. 3) states, unequal turnout heavily inhibits the quality of a democratic system, because the “privileged voters are favored over underprivileged nonvoters.” Thus electoral as well as alternative participation should be as equal as possible; the systematic abstention of specific social groups from the political process is seen as a disqualification of democratic equality (Teorell et al., 2007). Equality furthermore requires the inclusion of preferences of all persons possibly affected by political decisions taken within a democratic regime (Dahl, 1998). In representative democracies, inclusion presupposes high descriptive and substantial representation. An important prerequisite for equal preference formation and adequate responsive decision-making is transparency (Stiglitz, 1999). When the freedom of information is restricted and public visibility of the political process is not provided, the information mismatch may lead to unequal participation and, consequently, the unequal inclusion of preferences.


Although freedom and equality interact and can constrain each other, they are not generally irreconcilable (Talmon, 1960; Tocqueville, 1997 [1835]). Guaranteeing as well as optimizing and balancing freedom and equality are the core challenges of any democratic system. In order to maintain a dynamic balance between freedom and equality, a further fundamental principle of democratic rule is needed: *control*. Of course, control is not a simple auxiliary for the balance of the two other principles, but is rather an important basis of democracy itself; control is understood to be a means by which citizens maintain the accountability and responsiveness of their representatives. Representative democracy thus heavily depends upon a control of power exercised both vertically and horizontally.

Horizontal control functions as a network of institutions that mutually constrain each other (O'Donnell, 1994). This network of relatively autonomous institutional surveys, checks, and balances mutually constrains the elected authorities. Through mutual constraints, control of the government is not restricted to periodic elections but is also complemented by the mutual check and balance of constitutional powers. In representative democracies, vertical control is exercised by means of free, fair, and competitive elections (Manin et al., 1999). It is the elections that allow citizens to decide upon which balance they will accept between freedom and equality (Meyer, 2009). Effective elections must be competitive, because only competition allows a genuine choice and induces the political elite to act responsively (Bartolini, 1999, 2000). However, to ensure responsiveness, the results of elections must be effective. Vertical control would be polluted if elected representatives were to lack the capability to govern, that is, to implement the electoral mandate. Thus, governments require a certain degree of control over the political process, i.e. the capacity to effectively implement collective democratic decisions. Only democratically legitimized political decisions or the rule of law may constrain governmental autonomy (Etzioni, 1968).

FROM PRINCIPLES TO FUNCTIONS

To guarantee and functionally secure freedom, equality, and control, a democratic regime must fulfill several functions. These functions are deduced from the three principles (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: *The Concept Tree of the Democracy Barometer*



In a nutshell, we argue that the quality of a given democracy is high when these nine functions are fulfilled to a high degree. Of course, because of the tension existing between freedom and equality, a simultaneous maximization of all nine functions is impossible. Democracies are systems whose development is perpetually negotiated by political and societal forces. Hence, democracies can weigh and optimize the nine functions differently. However, the degree of fulfillment of each of these nine functions can be measured. This requires a further conceptual step: The various functions are based on constitutive components. In the stepwise deduction of the concept of democracy, the next step comprises the derivation of these components. Hence, each function is further disaggregated into two components, which finally lead to several subcomponents and indicators. In order to account for criticisms of previous measures, for each component there are subcomponents to measure legal rules and subcomponents measuring the effective constitutional reality. In the following section, I provide a very short description of the composition of the nine functions (for an extensive description, see Bühlmann et al., 2011, as well as www.democracybarometer.org and the Appendix 1).

INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

The existence and guarantee of individual liberties is the most important prerequisite of democratic self- and co-determination. Individual liberties primarily secure the inviolableness of the private sphere. This requires the *right to physical integrity* (Component 1). This component embraces constitutional human rights provisions and the ratification of important human rights conventions, which are perceived as an

indication of a culture that maintains the effective right to physical integrity (Camp Keith, 2002; O'Donnell, 2004). The effective and real protection of this right is mirrored by the fact that there are no transgressions of this right by the state, such as torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatments or punishments (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Furthermore, "states are only effective in rights protection to the extent that citizens themselves are prepared to acknowledge the rights of others" (Beetham, 2004, p. 72). Thus, a high homicide rate or violent political actions restrict the effectiveness of the right to physical integrity.

The second component comprises a further aspect of individual liberties, which is the *right to free conduct of life*. On the one hand, this encompasses freedom of religion and freedom of movement. On the other hand, it requires that property rights be adequately protected. Again, these measures distinguish between constitutional provisions guaranteeing the free conduct of life and the effective implementation and impact of these rights.

RULE OF LAW

Individual liberties and political rights (see below) require protection in accordance with the rule of law (Habermas, 1992). Rule of law designates the independence, the primacy, and the absolute warrant of and by the law. This requires the same prevalence of rights, as well as formal and procedural justice for all individuals (Beetham, 2004; Rawls, 1971). *Equality before the law* (Component 1) is based on constitutional provisions for the impartiality of the courts. Additionally, the legal framework must be independent and effectively impartial, that is, it must not be subject to manipulation (O'Donnell, 2004). The *quality of the legal system* (Component 2) depends on the constitutionally mandated professionalism of judges (Camp Keith, 2002; La Porta et al., 2004) and on the legitimacy of the judicial system. The justice system cannot receive legitimacy by means of elections (like the other two powers). Rather, judicial legitimacy is based on the confidence of citizens in the justice system (Bühlmann & Kunz, 2011; Gibson, 2006) and in the institutions ensuring the monopoly of force.

PUBLIC SPHERE

The principle of freedom is completed by the function of the public sphere. Here, individual rights have an essential collective purpose: taking part with others in the expression of opinions and seeking to persuade and mobilize support are considered important components of freedom (Beetham, 2004, p. 62). The communication of politics and moral norms occurs in the public sphere (Habermas, 1992); a vital civil society and a vivid public sphere are ensured by means of *freedom of association* (Component 1) and *freedom of opinion* (Component 2). Freedom of association must be constitutionally guaranteed. Additionally (relying on social capital research), a vital civil society relies on the density of associations or unions defending political and public interests (Putnam, 1993; Teorell, 2003; Young, 1999). Formal

social capital is viewed as a sign of the positive functionality of the free articulation and collection of preferences. Freedom of opinion presupposes constitutional guarantees as well. In modern, representative democracies, opinion making and diffusion within the public sphere is first and foremost concerned with media and the media system. Public communication primarily takes place via mass media. Thus, media should provide a wide and accessible forum for public discourse (Graber, 2003).

COMPETITION

Vertical control of the government is established via free, regular and competitive elections. Bartolini (1999, 2000) distinguishes four components of democratic competition, two of which, *vulnerability* (Component 1) and *contestability* (Component 2), best conform to a middle-range concept of democracy and the idea of vertical control (Bartolini, 2000). *Vulnerability* corresponds to the uncertainty of the electoral outcome (Bartolini, 2000; Elkins, 1974), which is indicated by the closeness of election results as well as by the degree of concentration of parliamentary seats. Furthermore, formal rules have an impact on vulnerability: district size and the legal possibility of redistricting may influence competition. *Contestability* refers to the stipulations that electoral competitors have to meet in order to be allowed to enter the political race. The effective chance of entering is measured by the effective number of electoral parties, the ratio of parties running for seats to the parties winning seats, and by the existence and the success of small parties (Bartolini, 1999; Tavits, 2006).

MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS

The horizontal and institutional dimension of control of the government is encompassed by mutual constraints of constitutional powers. The balance of powers first depends upon the *relationship between the executive and the legislature* (Component 1). An effective opposition, as well as constitutional provisions for mutual checks in terms of possibilities for deposition or dissolution, guarantee the mutual control of the first two branches (Ferrerres-Comella, 2000). Of course, there must be *additional checks of powers* (Component 2). On the one hand, mutual constraints are completed by the third branch, in the form of constitutional jurisdiction, that is, the guaranteed possibility to review the constitutionality of laws. On the other hand, federalism is seen as an important means of control. In line with the research on federalism, the degree of decentralization, as well as the effective sub-national fiscal autonomy, are incorporated into the measure (Schneider, 2003).

GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY

One important feature of representative democracy is the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004a). Citizens' preferences are collected, mobilized, articulated, and aggregated by means of elections, and are translated into parliamentary seats. The chain has a further link, namely, responsive implementa-

tion, which requires that policy decisions must accord to initial preferences. A responsive implementation, however, requires governmental capability, that is, the availability of *resources* (Component 1) and *conditions for efficient implementation* (Component 2).⁸ Resources must ensure the effective and impartial implementation of political decisions. Thus, governments must count on high levels of public support (Chanley et al., 2000; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). Furthermore, both a wide time horizon in terms of the length of the legislature and the stability of the government facilitate more continuous and thus more responsive implementation (Harmel & Robertson, 1986). Efficient implementation is more difficult when it runs into the opposition of citizens who may attempt to hinder it by means of strikes, demonstrations, or even illegitimate anti-governmental action. Contrarily, an efficient bureaucracy can help to facilitate implementation. Furthermore, the policy making process loses its democratic quality when illegitimate actors exert influence over it.

TRANSPARENCY

Secrecy, or a lack of transparency, will have severe adverse effects on the quality of a democracy: "Secrecy provides the fertile ground on which special interests work; secrecy serves to entrench incumbents, discourage public participation in democratic processes, and undermine the ability of the press to provide an effective check against the abuses of government" (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 14). Opacity is a severe danger for equality. Thus, transparency first and foremost means *no secrecy* (Component 1). Secrecy can manifest in the form of corruption and bribery (Stiglitz, 1999), which are considered a proxy for low transparency. The unjustified favoritism of particular interests is also linked to rules of party financing. The second component measures whether a democracy provides *provisions for a transparent political process*. The availability of information depends upon the guaranteed freedom of information (Islam, 2006) as well as on the culture of openness, or, the willingness of the government to communicate in a transparent way, as well as the informational openness of the media system.

PARTICIPATION

In a high-quality democracy, citizens must have equal participation rights: all persons who are affected by a political decision should have the right to participate in shaping this decision. This implies that all citizens in a state must exercise suffrage rights (Banducci et al., 2004; Paxton et al., 2003). Furthermore, these rights should be used in an equal manner (Teorell, 2006). Equal respect and consideration of all interests by the political representatives is only possible if participation is as widespread and as equal as possible (Lijphart, 1997; Rueschemeyer, 2004). Unequal turnout in terms of social characteristics or distribution of resources "may mirror social divisions, which in turn can reduce the effectiveness of responsive democracy" (Teorell et al., 2007, p. 392). We therefore take the *equality of participation* (Component 1) into account. Of course, the *effective use of participation* (Component 2) is also im-

portant. Based on the idea that high turnout correlates with equal turnout (Lijphart, 1997), the level of electoral as well as non-institutionalised participation is considered. Additionally, the effective use of participation can be facilitated or hindered by different rules (for example, voting in advance, or registration).

REPRESENTATION

Democracy means that all citizens must have the possibility of co-determination. In representative democracies, this is ensured by means of representation agencies. Responsive democracies must ensure that all citizens' preferences are adequately represented in elected offices. This is, on the one hand, ensured by *substantive representation* (Component 1). High distortion in terms of high disproportionality between votes and seats or in terms of low issue congruence between the representatives and the represented are signs of an unequal inclusion of preferences (Holden, 2006; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Structural opportunities, such as a large number of parliamentary seats or direct democratic institutions, can help to better incorporate preferences into the political system (Powell, 2004b). On the other hand, equal consideration of citizens' preferences is ensured by *descriptive representation* (Component 2), first and foremost of minorities. The access to political office for ethnic minorities must not be hindered by legal constraints (Banducci et al., 2004). The DB further focuses on women as structural minorities. Adequate representation is an important claim for approaches to descriptive representation (Mansbridge, 1999; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007). Even after over 100 years of women's suffrage rights, this claim should be fulfilled in any established democracy.

MEASURING THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

As discussed in the introduction, not only does a measurement need to adequately specify its concept, but it must also face the challenges of measurement and aggregation. The DB is based on the idea that the degree of fulfillment of each of the nine functions discussed above can be measured. For this purpose, the components are further divided into subcomponents, which are then measured according to several indicators. There is insufficient space to discuss each indicator in this contribution, but it is worth noting that the DB consists of a total of 100 indicators, each of which was selected from a large collection of secondary data (see Appendix). In order to overcome the shortcomings of previous democracy measures, the final indicators had to meet several criteria: *First*, we attempted to avoid indicators that were based on expert assessments, because they are quite debatable and not particularly transparent (Bollen & Paxton, 2000). We therefore relied as often as possible on 'objective' measures, or on the construction of indicators from different representative surveys. *Second*, to reduce measurement errors, we attempted to include indicators from a variety of sources for every subcomponent (Kaufmann &

Kraay, 2008). *Third*, the DB attempts to avoid 'institutional fallacies' (Abromeit, 2004). Therefore the DB is based not only on indicators that measure the existence of constitutional provisions but also on indicators that assess real manifestation. Each component consists of at least one subcomponent measuring rules in law and of one subcomponent measuring rules in use.

With regard to the aggregation of the indicators, it is necessary to discuss scaling thresholds. For the DB, these thresholds were set on the basis of 'best practice'. This procedure reflects the idea that democracy should be viewed as a political system that continuously re-defines and alters itself depending on ongoing political and societal deliberation (Beetham, 2004). Consequently, each given democracy weights the principles and functions differently. We defined a 'blueprint' country sample, which encompasses 30 established liberal democracies (all countries that have constantly been rated as full-fledged democracies by both the Freedom House as well as the Polity index for the time span of 1995 to 2005).⁴ Within this blueprint sample, all indicators were standardized from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating the highest value (that is, best practice with regard to the fulfillment of the function) and 0 the worst value within the 330 country-years. This blueprint sample is enlarged longitudinally and in terms of the number of countries. Thus, it is possible for there to be values below 0 as well as above 100. It is important to note that values below 0 do not mean 'no democracy,' but simply indicate levels worse than the worst established democracy between 1995 and 2005. Accordingly, values above 100 only indicate a comparatively better performance.

The conceptualization of the DB in terms of its different levels of abstraction further requires the definition of aggregation rules. The first two levels of aggregation – from indicators to subcomponents and from subcomponents to components – are based on arithmetic means. In the following steps (components to functions, functions to principles, principles to 'Quality of Democracy'), the idea of optimal balance is implemented: the value of the higher level has been calculated with a formula rewarding high values at the lower level, but penalizing incongruence between pairs of values.⁵

⁴ These criteria (FH-scores < 1.5 and Polity-scores > 8 for the whole time-span between 1995 and 2005; more than 250'000 habitants) apply to 34 countries: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the USA. However, Cape Verde, Bahamas, Barbados, and Mauritius are too lacking in data and are therefore sorted out from the blueprint sample. Thus, the blueprint sample is composed of 330 country-years. The sample used in this contribution embraces 53 countries and a time span of 1990 – 2007.

⁵ For measuring variation in the quality of democracy properly, the relationships between principles, functions, components, and sub-components have to be translated into aggregation rules, which fit the hierarchical concept of our theory. Our aggregation rule therefore is based on the following six basic assumptions: (1) Equilibrium is regarded as a positive feature. It indicates that (at a certain level), the elements of quality of democracy are in balance. Because the assumption of the underlying theory is that the best democracy is one in which all elements show a maximum performance, and the worst is one in which all elements show a minimum of performance, this is justified. (2) Since we are dealing in the framework of the "blue print countries" with democracies, we cannot apply the simple and strict rule of necessary condition. Instead, a modification, which allows for compensation of poor quality in one element by better quality in another element, is introduced. (3) Com-

(3) VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACIES

In the following analyses, we use a sample of 954 country-years (53 countries between 1990 and 2007). 23 countries were added to the 30 blueprint-countries and the longitudinal dimension was expanded from 1995 back to 1990 and from 2005 to 2007. The choice of the 23 additional countries follows the logic of the choice of the blueprint countries: we include those countries that (1) score high on Polity as well as on Freedom House in the 1990s and (2) have no omissions concerning the 100 basic indicators.⁶


One important aim of the DB is the description of various profiles of democracy. We assume that some of the nine functions can be seen as trade-offs, rivaling each other to a certain extent. Additionally, we expect that different democratic regimes weight the nine functions differently and thus attempt to achieve different optima. These different optima, or shapes, of democracy can best be illustrated by cobweb diagrams whose axes represent the democratic functions.


Figure 2 depicts the shape of different country groups according to the mean fulfilment of the nine functions in 1990 and 2007.

pensation, however, cannot result in full compensation (substitutability). The larger the disequilibrium, the lesser the compensation. Thus, disequilibrium must be punished relative to equilibrium. (4) Punishment for equal degrees of disequilibrium should be punished equally, and larger disequilibrium more than smaller disequilibrium. This implies progressive discount the larger the disequilibrium. (5) From this, it follows that punishment is disproportional and that the measure does not follow the rule of the mean but rather progression. (6) Increase in quality is progressive, but with diminishing marginal returns. We assume that, from a certain level on, an increase in quality in one or more elements boosts the quality of democracy, whereas above a certain quality, increases in quality are smaller. Thus, the measure should be progressive and should consider diminishing marginal utility in the increase of quality of democracy when a higher level is reached. In order to achieve progression, multiplication has been applied. In order to achieve diminished marginal returns, we apply an Arctan function: Value of a function = $(\arctan(\text{component1} * \text{component2}) * 1.2/4000) * 80$. When there are three elements, we use the mean of the pairwise values, i.e.: Value of a principle = $\{[(\arctan(\text{component1} * \text{component2}) * 1.2/4000) * 80] + [(\arctan(\text{component1} * \text{component3}) * 1.2/4000) * 80] + [(\arctan(\text{component2} * \text{component3}) * 1.2/4000) * 80]\} / 3$. The formula is more complex when there are values below 0. A more detailed description of our aggregation can be found in the methodological handbook at www.democracybarometer.org.

⁶ The final sample consists of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The calculations for Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia begin with 1992 (that is, the year of the birth of these nations). For 9 indicators (Secprop, Fairjust, Memenviron, Devbeh, Givdec, Bribcorr, Transp, Issuecongr, and Publser; see Appendix for explanations), we were required to perform imputations for some of the additional countries. The indicators from the same subcomponent served as the reference for simple regression imputations. Further countries that also scored highly on Polity and Freedom House were excluded due to too many omissions (Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New-Guinea, Paraguay, Taiwan, and Trinidad & Tobago).

Figure 2: Varieties of democracies





IL: Individual Liberties; RL: Rule of Law; PS: Public Sphere; CO: Competition; MC: Mutual Constraints; GC: Governmental Capability; TR: Transparency; PA: Participation; RE: Representation.

Several observations from Figure 2 can be highlighted.

First, there are indeed very different shapes of democracy in the different country groups.

Second, comparing the different country groups, not only are there variations in the size of the surface but there are also differences in the accent of the different functions. Compared to the mean of all countries (row 1 in table 2 and a thin black line in all other cobwebs), the group of *established democracies* (that is, *Western European democracies together with the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*) performs best in 1990 as well as in 2007. The bigger surface compared with all countries is first and foremost due to better performances in the function of 'Rule of Law and Transparency.' Also, the gap concerning the function of 'individual liberties' seems to diminish over time. This, however, is not due to

a decrease in this function within the established democracies, but is primarily due to the catching-up of all other countries.

The *Eastern European countries* show an interesting development in terms of the quality of democracy and of the different functions. All in all, the surface becomes larger and more balanced. However this improved balance is not simply due to an increase of all functions, but in some cases is even due to a decline in certain functions. Most striking are the changes in the functions 'participation,' 'transparency,' and 'rule of law.' While the Eastern European countries seem to place a greater emphasis on transparency, rule of law and participation show a decrease. The phenomenon of declining participation is widely observed in ex-Sovjet countries and can be explained by decreasing euphoria, or what Inglehart and Catterberg (2002, p. 300) called the "post-honeymoon effect." The data provided by the Democracy Barometer suggests that the sharp decline in the rule of law can be traced back to a decline of the effective independence and impartiality of the judiciary in most of the Eastern European countries.

Compared to the other country groups, the quality of the *Latin American democracies* seems to develop in parallel to the overall quality. However, this also means that Latin America is not apt to catch up with the fulfillment of the various functions. The most striking gaps between Latin America and all countries in the sample can be observed concerning the rule of law and transparency. Similarly to the Eastern European countries, it is striking that there is a decline in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. This time, however, this observation cannot be made for all countries. The Latin American group reveals itself to be very heterogeneous (see below).


The two most obvious observations for the six *Asian democracies* in the sample are the growth in participation and the comparatively large and relatively stable gap in terms of representation and transparency. In fact, only in the Asian group is there no observable decline in terms of the value for the function of 'participation.' This development is not due to an increase in electoral or alternative participation, but is first and foremost due to an expansion of suffrage rights and equality of participation. The comparatively high difference in the function of 'representation' can be explained by the relatively low level of female representation in politics. With the exception of Japan, the low values in transparency can be traced back to a comparatively high degree of corruption within the political system.

Third, all in all, in most of the country groups, the shapes became larger. Thus, the overall quality of democracy seems to have increased over time in all country groups.

Of course, the regional means hide the individual country characteristics, that is, the different shapes of democracy of the individual countries in the sample. With the Democracy Barometer we can observe various developments in the different countries over time. As an example, we depict the cobwebs of the country with the highest overall mean of quality of democracy in the sample (Denmark) and the country

with the lowest overall mean of quality (Venezuela). Additionally, we show the development of the only African democracy in the sample, South Africa.

Figure 3: Cobwebs of selected countries: The quality of democracy in Denmark, Venezuela, and South Africa




IL: Individual Liberties; RL: Rule of Law; PS: Public Sphere; CO: Competition; MC: Mutual Constraints; GC: Governmental Capability; TR: Transparency; PA: Participation; RE: Representation.

Again, we can observe very different shapes and different emphases in terms of the functions. Most striking are the differences between Denmark and Venezuela. While the former performs well in all nine functions except the function of 'public voice' (which seems to be a problem for all countries), Venezuela has very low performances in most of the nine functions. Given its development, it is difficult to consider Venezuela in 2007 a democracy. The development is also striking in South Africa. Of course, in 2007 the only African country in the sample is still far away from the countries with the highest quality. But compared to the apartheid-regime in 1990, the developments concerning freedom are striking. However, the success of the strongest party, the ANC, seems to have had a negative impact on political competition.

With the cobwebs we begin to see the possibility of illustrating the concept of different accentuations of the different functions. The comparison between other countries allows for a better understanding of the inherent weaknesses and strengths of various democracies. Another possibility for detecting the nuances of different varieties of democracies is to examine the higher aggregated values. For instance, we can distinguish the countries in the sample according to their weightings of the principles. As argued above, I suggest that a country with a high quality of democracy achieves a good balance of the principles of 'freedom' and 'equality.' When we look at the overall development of these two principles in the investigated time span (1990 to 2007), we can observe that the democratic world has improved in terms of freedom and foremost in terms of equality over time (figure 4). Freedom increased between 1990 and 2000, declined after 2000, and then slowly increased again. One can also observe a growing imbalance between freedom and equality.


Figure 4: The development of *freedom and equality* (mean of all 53 countries)



Of course, there are very different regional and country-specific patterns that help to explain the overall picture. First, the decline of freedom beginning in the year 2000 can be partially explained by the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and by the impact of the dotcom-crises. The fight against terrorism resulted in restrictions of individual rights in some of the countries listed in the sample. The sharpest decline in freedom between the mid 1990s and 2007, however, can be found in Eastern Europe. The above-mentioned decline of the function of 'rule of law' is the most important explanation for this decline.

When we examine the countries individually, we can distinguish them in terms of the different weights they give to the two principles of freedom and equality. Liberal countries place higher value on the principle of 'freedom' than on the principle of 'equality,' whereas egalitarian countries emphasize equality more than freedom. In the sample, we can find 14 'liberal' countries (Brazil, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Philippines, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States), 29 'egalitarian' countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Venezuela), eight countries that changed from being liberal to being egalitarian (Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, New Zealand, Uruguay, Belgium, Croatia, and Thailand) and two countries that changed from being egalitarian to being part of the liberal group of countries (Chile and South Africa). Again, I highlight one particular case. In the UK (Figure 5), we can observe a change in the accentuation of the two principles, coinciding with a change in government. The remarkable shift in the emphasis on freedom and equality follows the historical change of government in 1997. While during the Major government freedom received a higher weight than equality, there was a slow reversal under the Blair government. In this regard, it is important to note that the DB does not use indicators that measure the ideological basis of government parties or the party composition of governments.

Figure 5: The development of *freedom and equality in the United Kingdom*



The growing gap between freedom and equality that can be observed in Figure 4 cannot be found in all countries. In fact, in 25 countries, the gap in 2007 is wider than it was in 1990. However, in the remaining 28 countries, the gap decreases. Again, there are certain interesting patterns: the balance between freedom and equality is superior in countries with a high quality of democracy in 1990. Thus, well established, or high-quality, democracies seem to better succeed at balancing the two principles and also have less up- and downturns.


The figures above suggest developments over time. In most cases, this development seems to be positive, that is, the shapes of the spiders grow larger over time and the values of the principles grow. However, the development of the quality of democracy over time deserves a deeper investigation and is therefore the next topic of this contribution.

(4) CRISES AND SUCCESS STORIES

The main question regards the development of the quality of democracy over time: is there a crisis of democracy? Or can we observe an ongoing development into an end of history, with perfect democracies all over the world?

The spiders from section 3 may serve as intuitive description. Comparing the shape of all countries over time, we can observe a very small dilatation. However, to investigate the development of the quality of democracy, I use the final overall aggregation score provided by the DB (the aggregation of the three principles). With this score, I can draw a line that shows the mean development of all countries from 1990 to 2007 (Figure 6).

Figure 6: the overall development of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 (mean of all 53 countries).



As suggested from the figures and tables above, the Democracy Barometer demonstrates that there has been no reduction of the quality of democracy in the world of established democracies. Thus, we can certainly not speak of a worldwide crisis of democracy (at least between 1990 and 2007). However, there are two slumps that circumvent a positive linear development between 1994 and 1995, as well as between 2000 and 2001. While the downtrend in 1995 is primarily due to a decrease in the principle of 'control,' in 2000, all three principles declined.

Again, the overall mean development of the 53 countries hides the various developments within the individual countries. To analyze these individual developments, I use the mean difference of the overall quality score between each pair of subsequent years (1991-1990, 1992-1991, and so forth.). A negative

mean would indicate a mean decrease in the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007, whereas a positive mean indicates an overall increase. Using this simple measure, we obtain the results presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Mean development of the quality of democracy in 53 countries between 1990 and 2007 (ranked according to the mean difference of the quality of democracy of pairs of subsequent years)

Country	DQ 1990	DQ 2007	Mean Diff	Country	DQ 1990	DQ 2007	Mean Diff
Croatia	14.5	41.6	1.81	Malta	57.6	64.2	0.39
India	7.1	37.3	1.78	Philippines	6.8	13.0	0.36
Romania	2.3	32.1	1.75	Canada	77.8	83.0	0.31
Israel	25.2	51.1	1.52	Austria	60.5	65.4	0.29
South Africa	12.4	37.9	1.50	Iceland	80.7	85.6	0.29
Colombia	8.3	31.4	1.36	Netherlands	75.6	79.5	0.23
South Korea	38.6	60.7	1.30	Sweden	80.6	83.7	0.18
Estonia	45.0	63.5	1.23	Turkey	14.2	16.8	0.15
Czech Republic	37.7	58.1	1.20	Norway	80.3	82.1	0.11
Peru	11.3	29.4	1.07	Slovenia	67.6	69.2	0.10
Switzerland	60.7	77.3	0.98	Finland	85.2	86.7	0.09
Hungary	45.4	61.6	0.96	Portugal	61.1	62.6	0.09
New Zealand	57.9	72.3	0.85	Dominican Republic	11.0	12.2	0.07
Greece	29.9	43.4	0.80	Germany	74.7	75.8	0.07
Bulgaria	15.1	28.5	0.79	Denmark	87.4	88.4	0.06
Cyprus	49.2	62.5	0.78	Costa Rica	38.9	39.1	0.01
Poland	30.3	42.5	0.72	France	46.0	46.0	0.00
Belgium	74.0	85.4	0.67	Ireland	67.2	66.6	-0.03
Uruguay	44.6	55.1	0.61	United States	70.0	68.7	-0.08
Slovakia	26.6	36.2	0.56	Australia	65.6	62.7	-0.18
United Kingdom	40.9	50.3	0.56	Brazil	39.1	34.4	-0.28
Spain	58.5	67.7	0.54	Mexico	36.4	29.9	-0.38
Luxembourg	65.5	74.1	0.50	Argentina	31.4	24.2	-0.42
Lithuania	27.1	33.9	0.45	Thailand	24.1	16.3	-0.46
Chile	27.3	34.8	0.44	Venezuela	9.6	1.6	-0.47
Japan	44.6	51.8	0.42	Italy	61.2	52.2	-0.53
Latvia	50.0	56.4	0.42	Mean all countries	44.5	52.6	0.48

DQ 1990: Quality of Democracy Score in 1990 (for Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia in 1992); DQ 2007: Quality of Democracy Score in 2007

Table 1 depicts several interesting findings.


First, and most importantly for the purposes of this contribution: in only nine out of the 53 countries was the mean overall development of the quality of democracy negative. On average, the quality of democracy declined between 1990 and 2007 in Ireland, the United States, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, Venezuela, and Italy.

Second, at the top of the ranking, there are rather young democracies: eleven out of the 20 countries with the strongest mean development ascended to the group of democracies only in the late 1980s or early 1990s. When we include South Africa and the Czech Republic as newly established democracies, we even have 13 newcomers out of the 20 strongly developing countries. According to age, Switzerland and New Zealand are the only established democracies that show a comparatively high mean development.

Third, most countries showing significant positive development began from a low value of quality of democracy in 1990. Again, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Belgium are the exceptions in terms of this observation. However, some countries showed very low quality scores in 1990 but did not exhibit the same strong development: this is the case for Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, and Venezuela, which even lost ground in terms of quality of democracy over time.

Fourth, there seem to be regional differences. It is striking that four out of the nine countries with decreasing quality are Latin American countries, whereas the majority of Eastern European countries show considerable increases in quality. Figure 7 indeed shows very different developments in the various regions.

Figure 7: The development of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in different country groups.




Note: ESTAB: established democracies (AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, CYP, DEN, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, HUN, ISL, IRL, ITA, LUX, MAL, NED, NZL, NOR, POR, ESP, SWE, SUI, GBR, USA); ALL: all countries (mean); EASTEUR: Eastern European Democracies (BUL, CRO, CZE, EST, LAT, LTU, POL, ROU, SVK, SLO); ASIA: Asian Democracies (IND, JPN, PHI, KOR, THA, TUR); LATAM: Latin-American Democracies (ARG, BRA, CHI, COL, CRC, DOM, MEX, PER, URU, VEN)

The group of the established democracies slowly, but quite regularly, enhances the overall quality of democracy. The Eastern European countries demonstrated a great deal of progress at the beginning of the 1990s. This jump can be explained by the rapid change of socialist regimes to democratic systems. A closer look at this change reveals that it can be explained by a large improvement in the principle of freedom (in terms of individual liberties, rule of law, and public voice, i.e. the expansion of the press system). In the following years, the quality of democracy grew very slowly. The impressive development of the quality of democracy in the early 1990s within the Asian countries ceased in 1997 (probably due to the Asian economic crises) and has not resumed. The Latin American countries showed the weakest

development over time. The decline in 1995 can partly be traced to the economic crisis in Mexico ('el error de diciembre'), which led to a sharp decline of governmental capability primarily in terms of a decline of confidence.


These observations lead to the search for determinants that could explain the variations in development. Of course, there are several single and country specific explanations (see three examples in Figure 8): the change from the discriminating apartheid system to a liberal democracy in South Africa from 1989 to 1994 partially explains the development in this country. The progress of Switzerland is to a significant degree due to the total revision of the Swiss constitution in 1999. The reform of the electoral system seems to be one important determinant of the positive development of New Zealand: In 1994, the majoritarian system was changed into a more proportional voting system. This system change seemed to have a large impact on the functions of 'Representation' and 'Competition.'

Figure 8 *The increase of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in three single countries.*



Not only increases but also decreases can at least partially be explained by single events (Figure 9). In the United States, one can observe a positive development between 1991 and 2000; however, after 2001, the quality of democracy declined. This change in 2001 may be due to the change in government (from Clinton to Bush), the terror attacks in 2001 (which impacted the decline in the function of 'Individual Liberties') or to the dotcom crisis in 2000. The decline in Venezuela since 1998 seems to correlate with the rising to power of the 'Movimiento Quinta República,' and the up and downs in Italy are quite parallel to various changes in government. In this respect, it is important to again note that no indicator within the DB captures the party or ideological composition of governments.

Figure 9 The decrease of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in three specific countries.



However, to explain the various developments of the quality of democracy in the different countries, we should also investigate more general patterns. The question is, whether there are determinants that can explain the increases and decreases, as well as the differences between the countries, over time. From the observations above, and based on the literature, three groups of explanatory factors can be deduced: it is argued that (1) economy drives democracy, (2) that democracy is a result of human development, and (3) that different political institutions allow for greater or lesser development of quality of democracy. In the following, these three contentions are very briefly discussed.

ECONOMY DRIVES DEMOCRACY

The *modernization theory* (see Przeworsky & Limongi, 1997), argues that a country's economic well-being positively contributes to its regime quality: the wealthier a country is, the more likely it is to develop a high quality of regime (Li & Reuveny, 2003; Muller, 1988). Lipset (1959) already argued that distributional conflicts are lower at higher income levels. Furthermore, one of the inherent promises of democracy is the more equal distribution of income. With prosperity, distribution is easier, but only when the citizens demand better distribution. Of course, such claims are more enforceable in well-functioning democracies (Dahl, 1989). Economic development helps distribute political authority and democratic aspirations (Burkhart & Lewis Beck, 1994). Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that the stability of a democracy depends upon its economic structure: first, the better a capitalist democracy works, the more it is based on trust and the more difficult it would be to topple a democratic regime. However, as Muller (1995) reminds us, to foster democracy, economic growth must go hand-in-hand with improved equality of income distribution. When there are only few people benefitting from economic well-being, protests are likely, as is a deprivation of support for democracy and hence a decline of the quality of democracy.

Linked to this idea is a further determinant of democratization that is widely discussed: *globalization*. In the literature, we can find two competing suggestions regarding the relationship between globalization (economic globalization in terms of enlargement of global economic markets) and democracy (Li & Reuveny, 2003). First, according to the argument made by Muller (1995), it is argued that globalization obstructs democracy: the reduction of the autonomy of a national government and decisions that please foreign investors comes at a cost to citizens. Consequently, the level of democracy declines. Furthermore, it is argued that globalization enhances the gap between winners and losers (Kriesi et al., 2007), which can be seen a further negative impact on the quality of democracy. However, globalization is also seen as an important factor in the promotion of democracy: By reducing information costs (Diamond, 1992), by enlarging the scope of action for nation states (Gilpin, 1987; O'Riain, 2000), by expanding the electoral marketplace through denationalization (Sassen, 1996), or by dispersing ideas for advancing democracy (Ohmae, 1990), globalization accelerate democratization.

Linked to both the argument concerning wealth and that concerning globalization is a third economic determinant of the quality of democracy: economic crises. "*Economic crisis* represents one of the most common threats to democratic stability" (Diamond & Linz, 1989, p. 17). Linz (1978) argues that economic crises bring the danger that incumbent governments will be unable to solve certain critical problems and that this may produce legitimacy crises. The decline of citizens' confidence in the government can lead to the support of opposition parties that are sympathetic to more authoritarian solutions to address crises (also see the initial work of O'Donnell, 1973). Of course, this idea was widely challenged (Gasiorowski, 1995) because the relation between economic crises and crises of democracy is seen as being influenced by many other factors, such as cultural, historical, or institutional determinants.

Given the data from the Democracy Barometer, I test the following hypothesis:

The wealthier a country is, the higher is its quality of democracy. The more globalized a country is, the higher is its quality of democracy. The less a country is affected by economic crises, the higher is its quality of democracy.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

A second prominent discussion in the literature on democracy and democratization is the *human development thesis*. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) state, human development goes hand-in-hand with the democratic quality of a given regime. A high quality of democracy is more probable in countries where the quality of life is high and access to education is readily available to all inhabitants. Socio-economic development (improving health and life expectancy and rising levels of education) are seen as important prerequisites for the development of democratic values among citizens (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Muller

and Seligson, 1994; Rustow, 1970). These civic values “put political elites under popular pressure to institutionalize democratic rules and to keep these rules effective” (Welzel et al., 2003, p. 344; also see Gibson & Duch, 1994). Of course, and again, these ideas are challenged. While it seems evident that human development and democracy are related, the direction of the causality is not clear (Dahl, 1998). Countries with low education levels, health problems, and a low life expectancy, are normally not democracies (Anand & Sen, 2000). However, the question is whether human development fosters democratization or whether human development only becomes possible thanks to democratization. In this contribution, I compare established democracies to certain qualities of democracy. Thus, I do not test the impact of socio-economic resources on the process of democratization, but rather examine different levels of the qualities of democracies. I therefore test the following hypothesis:

The higher the level of human development in a country, the higher is the quality of democracy in that country.

INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The discussion of institutional influence on democratization and the quality of democracy hinges upon two main institutions: the electoral and the political system, that is, a proportional vs. majoritarian electoral system and a parliamentary vs. presidential system. In a nutshell: “institutional features that promote stability and compromise are widely thought to facilitate the persistence of democracy” (Gasiorowski, 1995, p. 883).

Based on the investigations of Lijphart (1977, 1999), it is argued that more consensual democracies are better democracies. For this contribution, I do not include all of the variables Lijphart used to measure the degree of consociational democracies. Rather, I concentrate on the most important institutional one, which is the electoral system. Lijphart (1999) argues that proportional electoral systems (PR) have advantages over majoritarian electoral systems because they allow for power sharing and therefore the inclusion of all (important) political interests and preferences. PR reduces the barriers for smaller parties representing the interests of minorities (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Norris, 2008), as each party receives a number of seats in proportion to its votes. Due to the greater number of (minority) parties, PR has an additional feature that strengthens power sharing: it fosters the probability of large government coalitions, or “executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 34). Due to its inclusive capacities, power sharing leads to more political (that is, diffuse, which is the term used by Easton, 1965, 1975) support even for minorities (Bühlmann & Hänni, 2010) and thus to a higher stability of democracy, resulting from better inclusion and thereby a higher quality of democracy. Of course, there are challenges to the idea of the potential of PR for inclusion. PR not only encourages the inclusion of mi-

norities, but also of small parties that might try to exclude other (for instance ethnic) minorities or veto consensual decisions (Norris, 2008).

The second institution assumed to influence democratization in terms of stability and compromise and, hence, also the quality of democracy, is the parliamentary system. In his initial study on parliamentary vs. presidential systems, Linz (1990, p. 52; also see Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Samuels & Shugart, 2001) arrives at the conclusion that “parliamentarism generally offers a better hope for preserving democracy.” He argues that parliamentarism provides better protection against ruptures due to policy changes. Furthermore, such policy changes are much better incorporated by parliamentary systems than they are by “rigid” presidential systems. Most important is the assumption that the winner-takes-all concept of the presidential system leads to a suppression of opposition and minority preferences, whereas in parliamentary systems, power-sharing and coalition formation helps to arrive at common solutions. Thus, it is suggested that parliamentary systems are more inclusive, more representative, more responsive, and more accountable (that is, more equal in terms of the DB) and that they should lead to a better quality of democracy than presidential systems. I conclude:

The quality of democracy is higher in parliamentary systems and in countries with PR electoral systems than it is in presidential systems and in countries with majoritarian systems.

METHOD AND DATA

The most common research design to test the above hypotheses, that is, for a cross-country comparison over time, is a time series cross-sectional or panel data analysis (PDA). However, for this study of the relationship between economy, human development and institutions, and the quality of democracy and globalization, I use multilevel analysis (MLA), a method recently being discussed as a promising alternative for PDA (Shor et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen & Bühlmann, 2008). The idea of using MLA for time series cross-sectional data is based on the treatment of observations over time as nested within units (in this case, countries), supposing that the development of the quality of democracy over time (level 1) differs from country to country (level 2).⁷

The advantages of MLA compared to PDA are better estimation in the case of a low number of observations, better model fit, and, first and foremost, higher flexibility in terms of estimating the effects of time-

⁷ The standard model takes the following form: $Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta X_{ij} + \alpha W_j + \mu_{0j} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The quality of democracy in country j at time i can be explained by an overall mean (β_0), time-dependent variables (the X variables and their respective β ; e.g. the economic variables or the HDI), time-independent country properties (the W variables and their respective α ; e.g. the institutional variables j), country variation (μ_{0j} with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between-country variance of σ^2_{μ}), and time variation (ϵ_{ij} with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within-country variance of σ^2_{ϵ}). The overall variation ($\sigma^2_{\mu} + \sigma^2_{\epsilon}$) is divided into differences at the time level (level 1 variance), which are explained by time-dependent variables, and differences between countries (level 2 variance). For a more detailed discussion of MLA, I refer to the relevant literature (Jones, 1997; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

invariant variables (in our case: institutions) and the possibility for estimating cross-level interactions (Shor et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen & Bühlmann, 2008). Of course, multilevel analysis also has its weaknesses. First, as with PDA, we must check for the problem of non-stationarity of the data. The discussion of the development of the quality of democracy in the previous section, as well as some statistical tests for unit-root, show that the dependent variable does not suffer from non-stationarity. Second, autocorrelation of the residuals must be corrected for. In my models I used difference matrixes for the independent variables (see Rasbash et al., 2009: p. 71-76).⁸ Finally, the number of cases (primarily the number of observations) is rather low. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with care.

The hypotheses deduced above are measured with the data described in Table 2. Of course, besides the three types of explanatory factors, there are other important determinants of the quality of democracy. I therefore include several controls in the models. *First*, it is argued that the development of the quality of democracy is also culturally determined. I control for the assumption that Protestantism fosters democratization. Protestantism is suggested to be more conducive to democracy because tolerance, trust, egalitarianism (or the willingness for compromise), all of which are cultural preconditions of democracies, are assumed to be more prevalent in Protestantism than in other religions (Bollen, 1979; Huntington, 1984).

Second, I include the size of a country measured by its population. The impact of size on the quality of democracy is extensively discussed in political philosophy (for an overview, see Dahl & Tufte, 1974). Most authors suggest a negative connection between size and quality. The greater the number of citizens living in a country, the greater is the probability that there are many different interests, which are difficult to represent. Furthermore, political interest, political confidence, generalized trust, and the willingness to participate, which are important pre-determinants for a high quality of democracy, are assumed to be higher in smaller units.

Third, and finally, I control for the age of the democracy. Two educated guesses are made in political theory concerning the relationship between the quality and the stability of democracy. On the one hand, it is suggested that aged democratic systems consistently lose the support and political confidence of their citizens and therefore show a downward trend in quality. On the other hand, it is assumed that young democracies are not stable and risk a loss of quality when required to face political and economic challenges.

⁸ The covariance between two measurements at year $i1$ and $i2$ on country j takes the form: $cov(ei1j, ei2j) = \alpha * (1/|ti1j - ti2j|)$, and the autocorrelation is then $cor(ei1j, ei2j) = (\alpha * (1/|ti1j - ti2j|)) / \sigma e2$. For $|ti1j - ti2j|$ we can build difference matrixes. α must then be estimated to correct for the autocorrelation.

Table 2: Measures

Variable	Operationalization	Hypothesis	Source
<i>Economy</i>			
GDP	Gross Domestic Product at purchasing power parity per capita.	The higher GDP, the higher the quality of democracy.	IMF World Economic Outlook Database
Globalization	Indicator combining flows (Trade, FDI, PI and income payments) and restrictions (Import Barriers, Tariff rate, Trade taxes, account restrictions)	The greater economic openness, the higher is the quality of democracy.	KOF Swiss Economic Institute (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008)
Inflation	Inflation, average consumer prices (Annual percent change; average consumer prices (Index, 2000=100).)	The higher inflation, the lower is the quality.	IMF World Economic Outlook Database
<i>Human Development</i>			
HDI	Human Development Index, combining data on life expectancy, education and per-capita GNI.	The higher the human development, the higher is the quality of democracy.	Human development reports (several volumes).
<i>Institutions</i>			
PR System	Dummy indicating whether in a country there is a proportional electoral system (1) or not (0).	The quality of democracy is higher in countries with a PR system.	Persson and Tabellini (2003)
Presidential System	Dummy indicating whether a country has a presidential system (1) or a parliamentary system (0).	The quality of democracy is higher in countries with a parliamentary system.	Persson and Tabellini (2003)
<i>Controls</i>			
Age of democracy	2006-year of birth of a democracy.	The older a democracy is, the higher is its quality.	Persson and Tabellini (2003)
Population	Number of inhabitants of a country for each year.	The bigger a country is, the lower is its quality of democracy.	IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
Protestantism	Number of protestants as a share of all inhabitants.	The higher the share of protestants in a country is, the higher is the quality of democracy.	CIA World Factbook

RESULTS

I attempt to first give answers regarding my hypothesis in a stepwise procedure. First, in an empty model, I examine whether there is variance in the development of the quality of democracy between countries and over time (model 1 in Table 3). Second, I test for the impact of the different determinants of the three approaches (models 2 to 7 in Table 3). Third, I check the robustness of these impacts by including the control variables (models 8 and 9 in Table 3).

Table 3: Determinants of the quality of democracy, empirical results

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
FIXED EFFECTS									
Constant	50.4 (3.0)**	45.1 (2.8)**	34.9 (3.2)**	50.4 (3.0)**	20.6 (3.5)**	51.5 (3.5)**	57.3 (3.4)**	36.0 (4.4)**	25.7 (4.7)**
<i>Economy</i>									
GDP	-	26.7 (2.9)**	-	-	-	-	-	7.0 (3.9)*	7.0 (3.9)*
Globalization	-	-	20.8 (1.6)**	-	-	-	-	12.2 (2.8)**	12.6 (2.8)**
Inflation	-	-	-	-11.8 (4.7)*	-	-	-	-3.1 (4.5)	-
<i>Human Development</i>									
HDI	-	-	-	-	38.9 (3.3)**	-	-	14.4 (6.1)*	12.6 (6.1)*
<i>Institutions</i>									
PR System	-	-	-	-	-	5.6 (8.1)	-	-	-
Presidential System	-	-	-	-	-	-	-20.5 (5.8)**	-16.3 (4.8)**	-11.9 (4.4)**
<i>Controls</i>									
Age of democracy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.1 (8.9)
Population	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.6 (10.8)*
Protestantism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.4 (7.0)**
RANDOM EFFECTS									
Time-Level (σ^2)	30.5 (1.4)**	28.3 (1.3)**	25.6 (1.2)**	30.3 (1.4)**	27.2 (1.3)**	30.5 (1.4)**	30.5 (1.4)**	26.5 (1.3)**	26.2 (1.2)**
Country-Level ($\sigma^2_{\mu 0}$)	491.1 (95.7)**	386.6 (75.2)**	457.8 (89.2)**	489.0 (95.3)**	307.1 (59.8)**	496.0 (96.6)**	403.2 (78.6)**	274.7 (63.6)**	217.6 (42.2)**
MODEL PROPERTIES									
Number of Timepoints (Countries)	944 (53)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)	944 (35)
-2loglikelihood	6204.2	6123.5	6044.8	6197.8	6076.6	6203.7	6192.7	6042.4	6019.7

Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables were rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 indicated the highest value of the variable. Coefficients indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. All models were calculated with MLwiN, restricted maximum likelihood estimations. * significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 99% level.

The first model in Table 3 depicts the empty model. One can observe that there is indeed significant variance between countries (level 2) as well as within countries, across time (level 1). While approximately 6% of the overall variance can be attributed to variation in development of the quality of democracy *within* the countries, 94% of the variance is due to *cross-country* differences.

In the following models, 2 to 6, I try to explain these variances. In terms of the economic variables, we can see that wealth (measured with GDP), as well as the degree of economic globalization, have a positive impact on the quality of democracy. At first glance, economic crisis seems to have the assumed negative impact. However, controlling for other factors, this effect disappears (see model 8). Thus, the results seem to support the 'modernization theory.' Furthermore, globalization seems not to do harm, but rather to promote the quality of democracy.

In model 5, I test for the impact of human development: as suggested, the HDI has a positive impact on the quality of democracy, even when I control for other variables. Basic socio-economic conditions in terms of health, education, and income not only foster democratization, but also seem to encourage the development of the quality of democracy.

In models 6 and 7, one can observe that institutions matter in terms of the quality of democracy. However, while the electoral system does not have the suggested effect, parliamentarism indeed seems to perform significantly better than presidentialism does. Again, this impact persists even under control.

To summarize: the development of economic well-being and of economic globalization, as well as of human development as measured by the HDI, indeed seems to correlate more or less in parallel with the development of the quality of a given democratic country. These impacts also hold when I control for further determinants (models 8 and 9). It is important to note that these variables measure the development over time, that is, they explain the level1-variance. As for the institutional variables, they explain the differences of the development of the quality of democracy between countries. While presidentialism seems to have the assumed negative impact on the quality of democracy, even when I control for other factors, PR loses its positive effect. Thus, in parliamentary systems the quality of democracy develops more efficiently than in presidential systems.

There are some noteworthy impacts of the control variables. First, in the sample of 53 democracies, the age of democracy seems to not play a role. Of course, the impact is positive and only slightly below the significance level of 90%. However, this could be taken as a sign that the old established democracies lose their advance. Second, population has a positive impact. Contrary to my assumption, the quality of a democracy grows more efficiently in larger sized countries than it does in small countries. A positive development of the quality of democracy is therefore not just possible in small and homogeneous countries. Third, Protestantism has quite a significant impact: the protestant culture highlighting interpersonal

trust, equality, and the search for compromise seems indeed to foster the development of the qualities of democracy.

All in all, the results more or less confirm previous findings discussed in the democratization literature. It seems that economy, human development, and parliamentarism not only help nations to become democracies, but also to become even better democracies.

(5) DISCUSSION

In this contribution, I sought to describe and explain varieties of democracies as well as differences in terms of the developments of the various qualities of democracy in 53 different democratic nations between 1990 and 2007. The investigations were based on a new instrument, the Democracy Barometer, a complex measuring tool that is able to assess the subtle differences in the qualities of various established democracies. With this instrument at hand, I first demonstrated that there is indeed a wide variety of democracies. Different countries give different weights to the nine functions assumed to be important and necessary conditions for the quality of democracy. We can distinguish not only geographical patterns, but also different developments over time, not only considering the forms of democracies as illustrated by the cobwebs, but also considering the different weightings of the principles of freedom and equality.

Analyzing the overall quality of democracy, that is, the overall aggregation of the functions and principles of the Democracy Barometer, I showed that – at least between 1990 and 2007 – there is neither reason to assume a crisis nor a glorious prosperity of democracy. In the time span of the investigation, only nine out of the 53 democracies showed a (non-linear) decline of quality over time. In the remaining 45 countries, I found a (non-linear) positive development in terms of the quality of democracy.

I then attempted to explain these various developments using widely used determinants of the democratization research. In a nutshell: the results are in line with the findings of previous investigations in democratization. However, contrary to previous studies of democratization, I neither tested for the development of autocracies into democracies nor for democratic stability, but I did test for the quality of democracy. In this sense, the findings are quite surprising, as they challenge the widespread view that once a country has become a democracy, neither economics nor human development can foster its further development. The results show that this is not the case. To the contrary, I argue that democratization is a never-ending process and that even established and old democracies can improve in quality. The results demonstrate that positive development depends upon economic factors as well as on human development: growing wealth, improved health, and improved education all help to improve the quality of democracy. Furthermore, improvement of the quality of democracy seems to work more effi-

ciently in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. The above-discussed gap between Latin American countries and the other democracies in the sample seems to be most convincingly explained by this institutional difference.

However, these findings still remain on a very highly aggregated level. With the Democracy Barometer it is possible to take a deeper look at the complexity of the development of democracy. When we examine the impact of the variables from model 9 in Table 3 on the nine different functions, we can observe some interesting differences. I provide two examples (the models can be found in Appendix 2): the positive and significant impact of the GDP can be observed for freedom and equality but not for control. The same holds true for globalization. However, economic openness has an even more complex influence on democracy: The more open an economy is, the higher are the values for the functions of 'individual liberties,' 'public sphere,' 'mutual constraints,' 'transparency,' and 'representation.' However, the higher the globalization index is, the lower is the value for the function of 'participation.' Could this be a sign not only of the positive impact of globalization on the spread of democratic ideas and institutions but also of the negative impact on political support, or the citizens' perception of the loss of the efficacy of their own votes? These very simple models show that democracy and its development is much more complex than can be evaluated with a single indicator. Thus, closer investigation is required and the Democracy Barometer can help to provide deeper insight into the connection between different determinants and the development of democracy. The stepwise construction of the Democracy Barometer allows at least a cautious approach towards a more thorough examination.

Of course, one could object that I investigated only a very short time span in this research. It could be argued that democracy was much better before 1990, or that the financial crisis of 2009/2010 was the main breaking point, and that we can observe occurrences all over the world even in the most established democracies that show a crisis of democracy (the violent demonstrations in Germany (Stuttgart 21), and the failure of government in Belgium, for example). Given the results of this contribution, I would argue against such an objection. First, there are always incidents around the world that show that democratization and the development of the quality of democracy is not, and cannot be, a linear process. Second, the comparisons in this contribution show that there are very different developments in different regions and countries. However, even when there are ups and downs, the overall picture is a very optimistic one. Of course, democratization in terms of the improvement of the quality of democracy is (and must remain) a never-ending process. The discussion on the forms of democracy, that is, the weighting of the different functions, must be the result of an ongoing political and societal discussion accompanied by critical social science. The Democracy Barometer can help to structure this discussion.

APPENDIX 1: CONCEPT TREES, COMPONENTS, SUBCOMPONENTS, INDICATORS, SOURCES

The colors in the conceptual trees have the following meanings:

dark blue: Overall quality of democracy score (QOD)

mint: principles

light blue: functions


yellow: components

orange: subcomponents measuring effective impact (rules in use)

pink: subcomponents measuring constitutional settings (rules in law)


green: indicators

For detailed information about the indicators and their sources, please refer to the codebook (available at www.democracybarometer.org).



1 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES

1.1 CONCEPT TREE




1.2 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Right to physical integrity	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical integrity	Consttort	Existence of constitutional provisions banning torture or inhumane treatment.	DAP
		Conv TORT	Ratification of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.	HDR
	No transgressions by the state	Politerr	Political Terror Scale; degree of political terror by government.	PTS
		Torture	Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.	CIRI
	Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by citizens	Homicide	Number of homicides per 100'000 capita (multiplied with -1).	EUROSTAT, WHO, PHO, UNO
		Riot	Number of violent demonstrations or clashes of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (multiplied with -1).	Banks
Right to free conduct of life	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing right to freedom of conduct of life	Constrel	Existence of constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom.	DAP
		Constfreemov	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement.	Div. constitutions
	Freedom of conduct of life	Freerelig	Extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. 0 = government restricted some religious practices; 1 = no restrictions.	CIRI
		Freemove	Citizens' freedom to travel within their own country and to leave and return to that country. 0 = restricted in a given year; 1 = generally unrestricted.	CIRI
	Effective property rights	Propright	Measures the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws.	HF
		Secprop	Personal security and private property are adequately protected.	IMD

2 RULE OF LAW

2.1 CONCEPT TREE




2.2 RULE OF LAW: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Equality before the law	Constitutional provisions for impartial courts	Constfair	Constitutional provisions for fair organization of the court system (no exceptional courts and hierarchical judicial system).	DAP
		Pubtrial	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial.	DAP
	Effective independence of the judiciary	Judindepcor	Level of independence of the judiciary (no inside corruption or outside influence).	AHR
		Judindepinf	Level of independence of the judiciary from political influences of members of government, citizens, or firms.	WEF
	Effective impartiality of the legal system	Impcourts	Legal framework is not inefficient and subject to manipulation.	WEF
		Intgrlegal	Integrity of the legal system.	Fraser
Quality of the legal system	Constitutional provisions for judicial professionalism	Profjudge	Professionalism (law degree, professional experience) is a precondition for appointment of judges to highest courts.	Kritzer
		Proftenure	Professionalism of judges concerning length of tenure. Professionalism is high, if tenure is not constricted, i.e. it is lifelong.	Kritzer
	Confidence in the justice system	Confjust	Share of citizens with confidence in the legal system.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Fairjust	Assessment of the confidence in the fair administration of justice in the society.	IMD
	Confidence in the police	Confpolice	Share of citizens with confidence in the police.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Fairpolice	Assessment of reliability/effectiveness of the police services	WEF

3 PUBLIC SPHERE

3.1 CONCEPT TREE




3.2 PUBLIC SPHERE: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Freedom to associate	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom to associate	Constfras	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of association.	DAP
		Constass	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of assembly.	DAP
	Degree of association (economic interests)	Union	Trade union density.	ILO
		Memproorg	Membership in professional organizations (share of respondents).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
	Degree of association (public interests)	Memhuman	Membership in humanitarian organizations (share of respondents).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Memenviron	Membership in environmental/animal rights organizations (share of respondents).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
Freedom of opinion	Freedom of speech	Constspeech	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech.	DAP
		Constpress	Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of press.	DAP
	Media offer	Newsimp	Import of newspapers, journals and periodicals as a % of GDP.	CD, OECD
		Newspaper	Number of daily newspapers per 1 million inhabitants.	WPT
	Political neutrality of press system	Balpress	Ideological balance of the press system.	BPHW
		Neutrnp	Share of neutral / independent newspapers' circulation.	BPHW

4 COMPETITION

4.1 CONCEPT TREE




4.2 COMPETITION: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Vulnerability (Competitiveness of elections)	Formal rules for competitiveness	Meandistrict	Mean district magnitude	Keefer
		Gerryman	Possibilities to delimit electoral districts; categories: 3 = no possibility; 2 = body responsible for drawing the boundaries is NOT executive or legislative; 1 = legislative is responsible for drawing the boundaries; 0 = executive is responsible for drawing the boundaries.	ACE
	Closeness of electoral outcomes	Largpavo	Margin of electoral concentration of votes; $Comp = 100\% - p_{strongest}$, where $p_{strongest}$ = percentage of votes obtained by strongest party.	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
		Votediff	100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all votes.	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
	Low concentration of seats	Herfindex	Herfindahl index: the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in parliament. Measures the degree of concentration (multiplied with -1).	Keefer
		Seatdiff	100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all seats.	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
Contestability (Openness of elections)	Low legal hurdles for entry	Adminhurd	Low administrative hurdles to become a competitor.	Bischoff, Hug, ACE, IPU, Bowler et al., CoE, Tavits, Elklit/Reynolds
		Legthresh	No or low legal electoral threshold; $100 - \text{legal threshold}$; when no legal threshold = 100	Keefer, Norris
	Effective contestation	Smallpavo	Chance for small parties to win a seat: share of votes of smallest party in national parliament (multiplied with -1).	WZB, IPU, Psephos, ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
		Nuparties	Number of important parties (>1% of votes) running for elections.	WZB, IPU, Psephos, ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
	Effective entry	Enep	Effective number of parties at the electoral level.	Gallagher
		Effparrat	Ratio of effective number of parties at the parliamentary level and the effective number of parties at the electoral level.	Gallagher

5 MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS

5.1 CONCEPT TREE




5.2 MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Executive-legislature relationship	Checks between executive and legislative powers	Controlle	Possibility for executive branch for veto power over laws passed by the legislature and for dissolving the legislature.	IAEP
		Controlex	Possibility for legislative branch to remove executive from office (instruments such as vote of no confidence / impeachment as well as difficulty to proceed).	IPU, Ismayr
	Balance between executive and legislative powers	Balpowexle	Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) according to Altman/Perez-Liñan 2002.	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
		Seatsgov	100- Proportion of parliamentary seats belonging to governing parties.	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB.
Additional checks of powers	Judicial review	Judrev	The extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional court) have the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country (from 2: full review of constitutionality of laws; 1: limited review of constitutionality; 0 no review.	La Porta et al.
		Powjudi	Power of judiciary. Possibility to control political decisions.	DAP
	Degree of Federalism	Ferdergeta	Federalism index as developed by Geering-Thacker (6 - unitarism); 1 = unitarian state; 5 = strong federal state	GETA
		Nonunitar	Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism (2-unitar);	QOG
	Subnational fiscal autonomy	Subexp	Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures	WB / IMF(GFS)
		Subrev	Subnational revenues as a percentage of GDP	WB / IMF(GFS)

6 GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY

6.1 CONCEPT TREE




6.2 GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Government re-sources	Time horizon for action	Legislen	Length of legislative period (if no given rule in constitution the maximum length is taken.	Con
		Govterm	Length of government term.	CIA
	Public support	Confgov	Share of citizens with high confidence in the government.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Devbehav	Share of citizens which do not endorse behavior and attitudes that are directed against the democratic society.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
	Governmental stability	Govstab	Stability of government; A cabinet is seen as stable if it is able to stay in government during the whole legislation.	IPU, WZB
		Cabchange	Number of major cabinet changes (multiplied with -1).	Banks
Conditions for efficient implementation	No anti-government action	Antigovact	Legitimate anti-government action (such as strikes aimed at national government policies or authority or peaceful gatherings for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority; multiplied by -1).	Banks
		Violantigov	Illegitimate anti-government action (such as armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime or illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government; multiplied by -1).	Banks
	No interference	MipRip	No political interference by military and religion.	ICRG
		Publser	Independence of public service of political interference.	IMD
	Administrative assertiveness	Govdec	Government decisions are effectively implemented.	IMD
		Bureau	Bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services.	ICRG

7 TRANSPARENCY

7.1 CONCEPT TREE




7.2 TRANSPARENCY: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
No secrecy	Disclosure of party financing	Discinco	Existence of provision for disclosure of income by political parties.	ACE, Casas-Zamora, IDEA-F, ODG, Toplak
		Discexp	Existence of provision for public disclosure of expenditure by political parties.	ACE, Casas-Zamora, IDEA-F, ODG, Toplak.
	Absence of corruption	Bribcorr	Assessment of the prevalence of bribery and corruption.	IMD
		CPI	Corruption Perception Index, ranging from 0 (high) to 10 (low) and measuring the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public and political sectors.	TI
Provisions for transparent political process	Freedom of information	RestricFOI	Restriction of freedom of information / barriers for access to official information.	Banisar, Tromp
		EffFOI	Effectiveness of Freedom of Information laws.	Banisar, Tromp
	Willingness for transparent communication	Transp	Assessment of the transparency of government policy.	IMD
	Informational openness	Legmedia	Examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate.	FH
		Polmedia	Evaluation of the degree of political control over the content of news media.	FH

8 PARTICIPATION

8.1 CONCEPT TREE




8.2 PARTICIPATION: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Equality of participation	Suffrage	Suffrage	Extent of universal active suffrage.	Paxton et al., IPU
		Regprovap	Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population.	IDEA
	Non-selectivity of electoral participation	Repturnined	Representative voter turnout in terms of resources (no participation gap in terms of education and income).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Repturngeag	Representative voter turnout in terms of gender and age (no participation gap).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
	Non-selectivity of alternative participation	Repaltined	Representative alternative participation (signing petitions, attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of resources (no participation gap).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Repaltgeag	Representative alternative participation (signing petition and attending lawful demonstrations) in terms of gender and age (no participation gap).	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
Effective participation	Rules facilitating participation	Facilitat	Facilitation of electoral participation.	ACE; Blais and Dobrzynska 2007
		Regist	Voter registration is not compulsory.	ACE, IPU, CON
	Effective institutionalized participation	Meanpart	Mean participation rate in % of registered electorate in legislative election and/or presidential elections (copied to all years) and/or national referenda (calculated into mean in corresponding year).	UCI, IDEA, IAEP, C2D
	Effective non-institutionalized participation	Petitions	Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having signed petitions.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
		Demons	Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents who indicate having attended lawful demonstrations.	WVS, LB, AsB, AfB

9 REPRESENTATION

9.1 CONCEPT TREE



9.2 REPRESENTATION: DESCRIPTIVE OF INDICATORS

Component	Subcomponent	Indicator	Short Description	Source
Substantive representation	Structural possibilities for inclusion of preferences	Seatperin	Number of seats (lower house) per inhabitants.	Keefer; QoG
		Dirdem	Opportunities for direct influence on political decisions. Availability of mandatory and facultative referenda.	BANKS, C2D, ACE
	No distortion	Gallagindex	Index of proportionality according to Gallagher (vote-seat congruence).	ACEA, AED, EEA, IPU, WZB
		Issuecongr	Congruence between left-right positions of voters and left-right positions of parliamentarians (measured by party positions).	Manifestos, WVS, LB, AsB, AfB
Descriptive representation	No legal constraints for inclusion of minorities	Polrightwom	Measures women's political rights, including the right to vote, the right to run for political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials.	CIRI, DAP
		Constraints	Measures the existence of constraints regarding passive suffrage.	IPU
	Adequate representation of women	Womrep	Proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in % of all seats.	IPU
		Womgov	Proportion of female representatives in the government (incl. ministers)	IPU; UNECE
	Effective access to power for minorities	Accpowmin	Access to power for minority groups.	MAR
		Poldismin	Index of political discrimination of minority groups concerning their unequal representation.	MAR

Sources:

ACE	ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. http://aceproject.org
ACEA	Adam Carr's Election Archive. http://psephos.adma-carr.net
AED	African Election Database. http://africanelections.tripod.com
AfB	Afrobarometer. http://www.afrobarometer.org
AHR	Annual Human Rights Reports of the U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt
Altman et al. (2009)	Altman, David, Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro and Sergio Toro (2009). Partidos y sistemas de partidos en América Latina: Aproximaciones desde la encuesta a expertos 2009. <i>Revista de Ciencia Política</i> 29(3): 775-98.
Altman/Perez-Liñan (2002)	Altman, D. and A. Pérez-Liñán (2002). Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eighteen Latin American Countries. <i>Democratization</i> 9(2): 85-100.
ANU	Australian National University. http://www.anu.edu.au
Armingeon et al. (2010)	Armingeon, Klaus, Romana Careja, Sarah Engler, Marlène Gerber, Philipp Leimgruber and Panajotis Potolidis (2010). Comparative Political Data Set III, 1990-2008. http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html
AsB	Asiabarometer. https://www.asiabarometer.org
Banisar (2006)	Banisar, David (2006). Freedom of Information Around the World. A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws.

	Privacy International Document. http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf
BCNTS	Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. http://www.databanksinternational.com
Bischoff (2006)	Bischoff, Carina (2006). Political Competition and Contestability – A study of the Barriers to Entry in 21 Democracies. Dissertation. University of Mexico (including data file).
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Bowler et al. (2003)	Bowler, Shaun, Elisabeth Carter and David M. Farrell (2003). Changing Party Access to Elections. In Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, edited by B. E. Cain, S. E. Scarrow and R. J. Dalton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BPHW	Banks' Political Handbooks of the World.
C2D	Centre for Research on Direct Democracy. http://www.c2d.ch
Casas-Zamora (2005)	Casas-Zamora, Kevin (2005). Paying for Democracy: Political finance and state funding for parties. Essex: ECPR press.
CD	Comtrade Database (UN). http://comtrade.un.org
CDA	CentralAmericaData. http://www.centralamericadata.com/es/article/home/Costa_Rica_y_El_Salvador_sin_Ley_de_Acceso_a_Informacion
CIA	CIA World Factbook.
CIRI	The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.

	http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp
CMP	Comparative Manifestos Project Data Set. http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projekte-manifesto.en.htm
CoE	Council of Europe (1998). Prohibition of political parties and analogous measures report. http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)014-e.asp
CON	Specific constitution of every country. http://confinder.richmond.edu
Coppedge (1997)	Coppedge, Michael (1997). "A Classification of Latin American Political Parties", Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper #244. http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2004/files/CoppedgeMichael.pdf
CSD	Center for the Study of Democracy. UC Irvine. http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. http://www.cses.org
CTS	United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html
DAP	Democracy Assistance Project - Phase II. Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Liñan, Mitchell A. Seligson and C. Neal Tate http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html
DPI	Database of Political Institutions 2009. Thorsten Beck , Philip E. Keefer, George R. Clarke, Thorsten Beck and Philip E. Keefer . Development Research Group. The World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2009_corrected_April2010.dta
EEA	Essex Election Archive. Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe.

	http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/
EED	European Election Database. http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database
EFWP	Economic Freedom of the World Project. Fraser Institute. http://www.freetheworld.com
Elklit/Reynolds (2002)	Elklit, J. and A. Reynolds (2002). The impact of election administration on the legitimacy of emerging democracies: a new comparative politics research agenda. <i>Commonwealth and Comparative Politics</i> 40: 86-119.
ESS	European Social Survey. http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org
Eurofound	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. http://www.eurofound.europa.eu
EUROSTAT	European Commission. Eurostat – key to European statistics. http://epp-eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home
EV	Early Voting. United States. http://www.earlyvoting.net/blog/2010/05/balloting-busy
FH	Freedom House. Freedom of the Press. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16
GALLAGHER	Election indices (www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/E%5CSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf); also see: Gallagher, Michael (1991). Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. <i>Comparative Electoral Studies</i> 10(1): 33-51. Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (2008; eds). <i>The Politics of Electoral Systems</i> . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GALLUP	Gallup Organization. http://www.gallup.com
GCR	Global Competitiveness Report World Economic Forum.

	http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm
Geering/Thacker (2004)	Geering John and Strom C. Thacker (2004). Political institutions and Corruption: The role of unitarism and parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 34: 295-330.
GFS	Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM. International Monetary Fund.
GURN	Global Union Research Network. http://www.gurn.info
HBI	Hans-Bredow-Institut. http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de
HDR	Human Development Reports. http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/indicators_table.cfm
Hug (2001)	Hug, Simon (2001): Altering party systems: strategic behavior and the emergence of new political parties in Western democracies. Michigan: Ann Arbor (including data file).
IAEP	Institutions and Elections Project Dataset. http://cdp.binghampton.edu/IAEP.htm
ICRG	International Country Risk Guide. http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx
IDEA-F	Political Finance Database. International IDEA. http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/
IDEA-T	Voter turnout. International IDEA. http://www.idea.int/vt
IEF	Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/index
IEFA	European health for all database.

ILO	http://data.euro.who.int/IEFadb International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org
IMD	Institute for Management Development, Lausanne. The World Competitiveness Yearbook / Report. Executive Opinion Survey.
IPU	International Parliamentary Union. Parline database. http://www.ipu.org/parline
IRI	Initiative and Referendum Institute. http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
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LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project. Vanderbilt University. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop
LB	Latinobarometro. http://www.latinobarometro.org
MAR	Minorities at Risk Project. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp
Mozaffar/Schedler (2002)	Mozaffar, Shaheen/Andreas Schedler (2002): The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance—Introduction, in: International

	Political Science Review 23: p. 5-27
MT	Mondo Times. The Worldwide News Media Guide. http://www.mondotimes.com
Nohlen et al. (2001)	Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann (2001). Elections in Asia and the Pacific. A Data Handbook. Vol. I+II. Oxford and London: Oxford University Press.
ODG	Office of Democracy and Governance (2003): Money in Politics Handbook: A guide to increasing transparency in emerging democracies.
OECD	Information and Communications Technologies OECD Communications Outlook (different issues). http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37441_1_1_1_1_37441,00.html
Østergaard (1992)	Østergaard, Bernt Stubbe (ed.) (1992). The Media in Western Europe: the Euromedia Handbook. London: Sage.
PaHO	Panamerican Health Organization. http://new.paho.org
Paxton et al. (2003)	Paxton, Pamela, Kenneth A. Bollen, Deborah M. Lee and HyoJoung Kim (2003). A Half-Century of Suffrage: New Data and a Comparative Analysis. Comparative International Development 38(1): 93-122.
PDoA	Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown University. http://pdba.georgetown.edu
PELA	Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina. http://americo.usal.es/oir/Elites/bases_de_datos.htm
PTS	Political Terror Scale. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org
QoG	The Quality of Government Institute. http://www.qog.pol.gu.se
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TI	Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/
Toplak (2004)	Toplak, Jurij (2004). Parteienfinanzierung in Slowenien und Kroatien. <i>Electoral Studies</i> .
Tromp (2008)	Tromp, Stanley (2008). Fallen Behind: Canada's Access to Information Act in the World Context. http://www3.telus.net/index100/report
UCI	University of California: The Election Turnout Database. http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. http://www.unece.org
UNSTATS	United Nations Statistics Division. http://unstats.un.org
USEP	United States Elections Project. http://elections.gmu.edu
Vanhanen (2008)	Women's Representation in National Parliaments 1970-2008. http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD2183/meF2183.html
Voltmer (2000)	Voltmer, Katrin (2000): Structures of diversity of press and broadcasting systems: The institutional context of public communication in Western democracies.
WB	World Bank Statistics. http://data.worldbank.org
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

WHO	World Health Organization: SDR, homicide and intentional injury (different issues). http://www.who.int/research/en
Wiesehomeier/Benoit (2009)	Wiesehomeier, Nina and Kenneth Benoit (2009). "Presidents, Parties, and Policy Competition", The Journal of Politics 71(4): 1435-47.
Wikipedia	The Free Encyclopedia. http://www.wikipedia.org
WP	Worldpress. http://www.worldpress.org
WPT	World Press Trends. Different issues. Paris: Zenithmedia.
WVS	World Values Survey.
WZB	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

APPENDIX 2

Table 4: The impact of the different determinants on the functions and the principles

	<i>Individual Liberties</i>	<i>Rule of Law</i>	<i>Public Sphere</i>	<i>Freedom</i>	<i>Competi- tion</i>	<i>Mutual Constraints</i>	<i>Govern- mental Capability</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Transpar- ency</i>	<i>Participa- tion</i>	<i>Represen- tation</i>	<i>Equality</i>
FIXED EFFECTS												
Constant	53.2 (4.5)**	67.7 (6.3)**	22.5 (3.7)**	45.8 (5.3)**	55.9 (6.1)**	38.8 (4.9)**	46.3 (7.2)**	42.3 (5.3)**	-15.8 (5.4)*	70.0 (4.8)**	28.4 (4.2)**	10.2 (4.3)*
<i>Economy</i>												
GDP	2.7 (5.2)	4.6 (4.9)	6.0 (3.0)*	9.8 (4.3)*	7.8 (6.7)	-6.5 (3.8)*	-5.9 (7.2)	-3.5 (6.0)	18.5 (5.3)**	-1.5 (4.1)	11.5 (4.2)**	13.2 (4.1)**
Globalization	12.8 (3.6)**	-5.2 (3.4)	12.2 (2.1)**	7.5 (3.0)*	-1.5 (4.6)	9.8 (2.7)**	4.6 (5.0)	2.2 (4.2)	16.7 (3.7)**	-13.6 (2.9)**	27.2 (2.9)**	16.0 (2.8)**
<i>Human Development</i>												
HDI	16.5 (7.3)*	-25.5 (7.6)**	-15.3 (4.7)**	21.7 (6.7)**	-3.7 (9.7)	14.9 (6.0)**	23.0 (10.8)*	22.4 (8.6)**	51.1 (7.9)**	-2.4 (6.3)	5.9 (6.3)	31.9 (6.2)**
<i>Institutions</i>												
Presidential System	1.8 (2.9)	-25.9 (6.2)**	5.3 (3.6)	-8.2 (5.0)*	-1.9 (4.4)	-1.8 (4.8)	-1.9 (5.7)	-4.3 (3.6)	-6.9 (4.4)	-15.8 (4.5)**	-1.4 (3.3)	-10.7 (3.7)**
<i>Controls</i>												
Age of democracy	-1.1 (5.9)	51.0 (12.5)**	7.3 (7.2)	25.5 (10.1)*	8.3 (8.9)	-11.6 (9.6)	8.3 (11.5)	-2.9 (4.7)	8.4 (8.9)	4.2 (9.0)	-14.7 (6.8)*	0.4 (7.5)
Population	-4.4 (9.5)	-32.4 (14.2)*	-3.8 (8.5)	2.8 (12.1)	19.3 (13.7)	22.8 (11.0)*	31.9 (16.6)*	43.9 (11.7)**	-3.1 (12.5)	20.6 (11.1)*	-10.8 (9.7)	-4.2 (10.1)
Protestantism	8.1 (4.6)*	15.4 (10.0)	12.2 (5.7)*	19.6 (8.1)*	1.4 (7.0)	5.3 (7.6)	15.7 (9.1)*	10.1 (5.8)*	13.9 (7.0)*	12.7 (7.2)*	19.8 (5.3)**	20.4 (5.9)**
RANDOM EFFECTS												
Time-Level (σ^2)	50.1 (2.4)**	40.4 (1.9)**	15.6 (0.7)**	32.0 (1.5)**	80.7 (3.8)**	25.0 (1.2)**	92.6 (4.4)**	66.5 (3.2)**	49.4 (2.3)**	28.4 (1.3)**	31.3 (1.5)**	28.8 (1.4)**
Country-Level ($\sigma^2_{\mu 0}$)	88.2 (17.6)**	436.1 (84.9)**	142.1 (27.7)**	284.9 (55.6)**	210.3 (41.7)**	254.6 (49.5)**	537.3 (70.1)**	143.2 (28.3)**	211.9 (41.7)**	224.8 (43.9)**	123.9 (24.4)**	153.0 (29.9)**
MODEL PROPERTIES												
Number of Timepoints (Countries)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)	944 (53)
-2loglikelihood	6550.4	6442.5	5536.8	6212.5	7020.1	5984.3	7170.6	6827.5	6583.1	6091.2	6146.8	6083.5

Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables were rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 indicated the highest value of the variable. Coefficients indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. All models were calculated with MLwiN, restricted maximum likelihood estimations.* significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 99% level.

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